Saturday, December 23, 2006

Shifting fault lines

A hypothesis worth pursuing...is that the new liberal regime is expanding its remit at the same time as—and perhaps because of—its decreasing capacity to deliver the wide-ranging social services it used to think of as essential to its mandate. If there is truth is this, the irony is rich: as liberal states, under pressures from increasingly globalized economic exchanges, are less and less able or willing to resist the progressive marketization of civil society, and the consequent dismantling of their welfare systems, they simultaneously pursue the progressive politicization of civil society. As the power to restrain business corporations slips through their fingers—indeed, as they all too willingly cede it—they grab hold ever more jealously of the reins of voluntary associations, which are easier targets. A diagnosis of this new apparent twist in the pathology of late modern liberal states awaits.
Jonathan Chaplin, "Living with liberalism: understanding regimes of tolerance," (2006) 34 Comment (no page #) online: Comment [http://www.wrf.ca/comment/article.cfm?ID=222].

I really don't have time to "comment" right now, but my first thought is that this idea could be related to Teubner's constitutionalization of private associations, which may not be the quite the same thing or have the same effects as Chaplin's preliminary diagnosis above. Other thoughts?

Friday, December 22, 2006

Democratic Legitimacy and the Scientific Foundation of Modern Law

Whether the science of law can give way to an art of legislation that would summon the just, the true, and the beautiful — what Plato in the Phaedrus calls the most purely shining-forth — is the question of our age.
- Roger Berkowitz, "Democratic Legitimacy and the Scientific Foundation of Modern Law, (2007) 8 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 90.

The doctrine of "efficient breach" holds that we should view contractual and regulatory remedies as redistributive measures rather than as moral sanctions. The award or fine is levied against the party in breach or violation, not because he ought not have done what he did, but because he should bear the cost of the benefit he gained through his actions. Remedies which make violators pay, says Berkowitz, are replacing injunctions as more efficient remedies for economic loss. The doctrine of efficient breach essentially means that violators are allowed to "purchase a license to continue their wrongdoing."

Berkowitz suggests that the ideal of justice is hard to square with the doctrine of efficient breach, though the legal structure legitimizes violations so long as people on the receiving end of the damage are properly compensated. Moreover, those who cause the damage and who pay up when told to (or even before they are told to) consider their actions to be not only legitimate but justified. The social reality that people are going to break the law forms the basis for a legal doctrine that guides a legal practice that, in turn, becomes a normative justification for breaking the law (100). In other words, social "facts" becomes laws that tend to amplify those same social facts -- and it is this mechanism of rule-making and norm creation that we call "legitimate".

This empirical kind of law-making might be legitimate, holds Berkowitz, but that doesn't mean it is just, as justice cannot be "reduced to or known through examples" (102).
...just action demands attention to oneself and to others
that responds not only to laws and norms but also to an "already presupposed ethical world." Beyond legitimacy...is the call of the ideal of justice.
Berkowitz traces the scientific interpretation of law's foundation through Leibniz to the crisis of authority in the death of God. Science is understood to be the only rational ground for law's authority and, even though science's authority has itself been critically undermined, we carry on as it if has not. Like Canadian political philosopher George Grant (see his little book English-speaking Justice), Berkowitz characterizes modern justice as the "refinement of technique" with people as its "human resource."

In the end, writes Berkowitz,
For those of us living through the divorce of law from justice, the rules of law appear naked, stripped bare of any claim to a higher good. We may praise law for its legitimacy, its fairness, or its efficiency, but we do not love it for its justice.
Meanwhile, the question of our age does not stand still but bears inexorably down on us.