Saturday, December 23, 2006

Shifting fault lines

A hypothesis worth pursuing...is that the new liberal regime is expanding its remit at the same time as—and perhaps because of—its decreasing capacity to deliver the wide-ranging social services it used to think of as essential to its mandate. If there is truth is this, the irony is rich: as liberal states, under pressures from increasingly globalized economic exchanges, are less and less able or willing to resist the progressive marketization of civil society, and the consequent dismantling of their welfare systems, they simultaneously pursue the progressive politicization of civil society. As the power to restrain business corporations slips through their fingers—indeed, as they all too willingly cede it—they grab hold ever more jealously of the reins of voluntary associations, which are easier targets. A diagnosis of this new apparent twist in the pathology of late modern liberal states awaits.
Jonathan Chaplin, "Living with liberalism: understanding regimes of tolerance," (2006) 34 Comment (no page #) online: Comment [http://www.wrf.ca/comment/article.cfm?ID=222].

I really don't have time to "comment" right now, but my first thought is that this idea could be related to Teubner's constitutionalization of private associations, which may not be the quite the same thing or have the same effects as Chaplin's preliminary diagnosis above. Other thoughts?

Friday, December 22, 2006

Democratic Legitimacy and the Scientific Foundation of Modern Law

Whether the science of law can give way to an art of legislation that would summon the just, the true, and the beautiful — what Plato in the Phaedrus calls the most purely shining-forth — is the question of our age.
- Roger Berkowitz, "Democratic Legitimacy and the Scientific Foundation of Modern Law, (2007) 8 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 90.

The doctrine of "efficient breach" holds that we should view contractual and regulatory remedies as redistributive measures rather than as moral sanctions. The award or fine is levied against the party in breach or violation, not because he ought not have done what he did, but because he should bear the cost of the benefit he gained through his actions. Remedies which make violators pay, says Berkowitz, are replacing injunctions as more efficient remedies for economic loss. The doctrine of efficient breach essentially means that violators are allowed to "purchase a license to continue their wrongdoing."

Berkowitz suggests that the ideal of justice is hard to square with the doctrine of efficient breach, though the legal structure legitimizes violations so long as people on the receiving end of the damage are properly compensated. Moreover, those who cause the damage and who pay up when told to (or even before they are told to) consider their actions to be not only legitimate but justified. The social reality that people are going to break the law forms the basis for a legal doctrine that guides a legal practice that, in turn, becomes a normative justification for breaking the law (100). In other words, social "facts" becomes laws that tend to amplify those same social facts -- and it is this mechanism of rule-making and norm creation that we call "legitimate".

This empirical kind of law-making might be legitimate, holds Berkowitz, but that doesn't mean it is just, as justice cannot be "reduced to or known through examples" (102).
...just action demands attention to oneself and to others
that responds not only to laws and norms but also to an "already presupposed ethical world." Beyond legitimacy...is the call of the ideal of justice.
Berkowitz traces the scientific interpretation of law's foundation through Leibniz to the crisis of authority in the death of God. Science is understood to be the only rational ground for law's authority and, even though science's authority has itself been critically undermined, we carry on as it if has not. Like Canadian political philosopher George Grant (see his little book English-speaking Justice), Berkowitz characterizes modern justice as the "refinement of technique" with people as its "human resource."

In the end, writes Berkowitz,
For those of us living through the divorce of law from justice, the rules of law appear naked, stripped bare of any claim to a higher good. We may praise law for its legitimacy, its fairness, or its efficiency, but we do not love it for its justice.
Meanwhile, the question of our age does not stand still but bears inexorably down on us.

Sunday, November 19, 2006

Corruption: Defined

The next series of entries will consist of excerpts and commentary related to my Chinese Law paper on corruption.

Corruption can be broadly defined as the "inappropriate use of political power" (Jain, 2001). Under this general definition, corruption can include both economic and non-economic abuses of power. Bribery is an example of the former; nepotism is an example of the latter. However, to say that corruption is the "inappropriate" use of power is almost to beg the question. In what instances can we say that political power has been used inappropriately? Is pork barrel politics, for example, an instance of corruption or is it just good representation? What about corporate financing for political parties? This line of questioning suggests that the definition of corruption is contextual and has a lot to do with the political norms of a given society.

The link between politics and corruption is noted by Jain when he says that "although corruption makes itself visible as an economic transaction [note this is not quite consistent with his broad definition above - JB], it would not exist if the political institutions were able to exert the necessary influences and controls." He then states explicitly that corruption reflects a failure of economic and political "markets" and that a "successful fight against corruption, which is really one part of the challenge for effective governance of societies, would seem to require a thorough understanding of the link between political institutions and corruption."

My sense is that, even if we were to confine ourselves to political corruption manifesting itself as an economic transaction, the fact we need to subject it to "influences" and "controls" suggests that such corruption consists of illicit transactions. That is to say, corruption violates a norm of some kind. But what kind of norm do we mean when we are discussing corruption? Legal? Cultural? Moral? It does seem apparent that corruption involves the violation of a social norm - the corrupt person rejects a broader interest (e.g. the public interest) to feed a narrower interest (e.g. him or herself, or his or her group). The corrupt person is under our opprobrium because he or she has somehow not performed the duties of the "office" he or she has been entrusted with and has used the prerogatives of that office for his or her own ends.

The duties of a given office depend on the social context of that office; when we are talking about public office, the appropriate use of an office will depend on its political context. Therefore, what counts as "corruption" will depend on the political shape of a society. Of course, it is possible that a society's stated understanding of corruption (as seen in its policies and laws) is inconsistent with its political shape as determined by its history, culture, and institutions. In that case, we can expect that corruption will be widespread unless and until the society's policies and laws also succeed in changing its political shape.

The questions for this paper will be:
  1. How is corruption legally defined in China?
  2. What "political shape" does China's legal definition presume?
  3. Is that political shape reflected in China's "public" sphere?
  4. What is the incidence of public corruption in China?
  5. What strategies is China using to reduce the incidence of corruption and are these strategies likely to be successful?
  6. If not, what should China be doing to attain a low incidence of corruption?

Friday, November 10, 2006

Public and Private International Law: Finding Common Ground

Though slightly off topic, this is an interesting entry by Kenneth Anderson, who thinks
...there should be room for scholars who consciously seek to bridge the academic divide between international public law and international private, economic, business, and finance law. In my own mind and work they are both seamless parts of the study of globalization, and in that sense can benefit from being pursued together. As aspects of the study of globalization, this seems like a very contemporary way of viewing private and public international law on a single continuum.
He would like also like to see more concepts from international economic development brought into the mix, and adds that the law of economic development is not simply about rights:
development work is equally well-considered as a matter of business, finance, rational choice theory, a peculiar species of foreign direct investment, and law and economics in the matter of how aid is provided, used, and its outcomes. It can be approached as business law, with huge benefits.

Wednesday, November 01, 2006

Filling the Regulatory Vacuum: Part 2

I may have shortchanged the last paragraph of the previous post to avoid getting into a (much longer) discussion of the preconditions for the question of democratic legitimacy. I would not want to leave politics or law out of the discussion; of course the standards-making process must be legitimate. But, in response to some grief over my setting aside of the question of democratic legitimacy, my points could be revised as follows:
  1. Western states have strong and thick administrative structures that are "legitimate" and often, in practice, unassailable; however, it is not usually the presence of these structures that lead to criticisms of the "democratic deficit". Rather, transparency and accountability are key factors in judging whether or not an administration (as opposed to a government) is legitimate.
  2. Developing states (often) have weak or thin administrative structures, and those structures that do exist are quite often highly contested (i.e. "the emperor is far away").
  3. All states are sovereign, which means, first, they are stuck with their administrative strengths and/or weaknesses and, second, they cannot fix the weaknesses of other states without "intruding."
  4. TNCs operate across states; therefore, they can take advantage of both the limited jurisdiction of the strong states and the limited laws or powers of enforcement within the weak state.
  5. Transnational regulatory systems also operate across states to address the regulatory vacuum of point #4 -- while both political (maybe even a type of colonization) and legal (they are comprised of rules and enforcement), they bypass but do not replace that particular political-legal container known as the state. If there are questions regarding their democratic legitimacy, they only mirror the questions of democratic legitimacy within the strong administrative state.
  6. The questions are complicated by the fact that transnational regulatory systems cross sovereign boundaries precisely for the purpose of making TNCs or even states accountable to strong, though sector-based, administrative regimes that are influenced neither by government agendas nor by market forces. The driving force behind these regulatory systems lies within that elusive domain of civil society, with its admixture of politics, morality, economics, etc.
I think these six elements lead to the conclusion that, while the question of democratic legitimacy may be relevant, it can only come after the questions regarding the nature of sovereignty, the modes of politics, and transparency and participation within non-state rule-making processes. These questions have the advantage that they can be addressed independent of whether or not a given state is democratic (a condition that would undermine any discussion of democratic legitimacy).

Tuesday, October 31, 2006

Filling the Regulatory Vacuum

This afternoon, Osgoode Hall Law School hosted Dr. Errol Meidinger, who presented "Beyond Westphalia: Competitive Legalization in Emerging Transnational Regulatory Systems" in one of Osgoode's periodic Putting Theory to Practice lectures. Meidinger argued that 1) evolution in, primarily, forestry governance is being driven by non-state actors and mechanisms and 2) certification standards are converging toward greater stakeholder participation and public disclosure of program audit results.

The fact that the standard-setting institutions are operating outside of the state context is significant. Standards developed by environmental and community groups (e.g. the Forestry Stewardship Council) are meant to hold industry to stringent performance criteria; industry-based standards (e.g. the Pan-European Forest Certification Council) tend to emphasize procedure and "continuous improvement". Both standards, in their incorporation of rule-making and monitoring functions, are examples of increasing legalization in non-state global governance mechanisms. As Meidinger pointed out, the "authority to manage standards has been lifted away from government agencies" -- but it is not becoming purely managerial. Rather, it is being both politicized and decentralized along industry sector lines. States that initially demurred in the face of public pressure to cooperate in the regulation of forestry practices are now adopting these "private" standards. This complicates the relationships between states, corporations, and NGOs as the latter two combine to negotiate legal-type structures which are then adopted by states as the result of political and economic pressures.

Does the new "transnational regulatory and governance regime" represent a challenge to democratic legitimacy? Comments from the audience suggested that these non-state standards (mostly developed by interest groups in the West) might be oppressive of states that are subsequently forced to adopt the standards in order to preserve access to profitable markets.

There are two factors that suggest another interpretation of the new regime -- and perhaps different questions. First, the appearance of the administrative state in the last century means that many more areas of human endeavour in developed nations are subject to government regulation. But, in the developing world, the power of states to control the actions of their industries and citizens is not so comprehensive. Second, the rapid growth of transnational corporations means that Western-based industries are able to outsource many of their factors of production to administratively weak regions.

Administratively strong states cannot (and perhaps should not) impose standards on these weaker regions through traditional international law-making institutions. The failure of "Westphalian" bodies to achieve consensus on environmental, labour, and other standards has left a regulatory vacuum that leaves transnational corporations room to set up shop far from the reach of extensive regulations in their home countries and allows them to operate freely within countries that, dependent on the economic benefits of foreign investment, are either unwilling or simply unable to implement strict regulations of their own.

Enter the transnational regulatory system that is able to 1) network with stakeholders around the world to develop best practices, 2) cut through political borders to monitor TNCs, and 3) enforce standards through the threat of decertification and consumer activism. In short, these non-state standards skirt global disparities in governmental power in order to make TNCs accountable to -- yes, stakeholders but, ultimately, publicly-minded consumers. As a result, the real strength of a TNC -- its brand -- is also its biggest vulnerability. The corporate brand is the bull's nose where the developing transnational regulatory system has inserted its ring.

Is democratic legitimacy still the right question? The above thoughts don't suggest that the question is not important -- only that it may be premature and perhaps irrelevant.