This afternoon,
Osgoode Hall Law School hosted
Dr. Errol Meidinger, who presented "Beyond Westphalia: Competitive Legalization in Emerging Transnational Regulatory Systems" in one of Osgoode's periodic
Putting Theory to Practice lectures. Meidinger argued that 1) evolution in, primarily, forestry governance is being driven by non-state actors and mechanisms and 2) certification standards are converging toward greater stakeholder participation and public disclosure of program audit results.
The fact that the standard-setting institutions are operating outside of the state context is significant. Standards developed by environmental and community groups (e.g. the Forestry Stewardship Council) are meant to hold industry to stringent performance criteria; industry-based standards (e.g. the Pan-European Forest Certification Council) tend to emphasize procedure and "continuous improvement". Both standards, in their incorporation of rule-making and monitoring functions, are examples of increasing legalization in non-state global governance mechanisms. As Meidinger pointed out, the "authority to manage standards has been lifted away from government agencies" -- but it is not becoming purely managerial. Rather, it is being both politicized and decentralized along industry sector lines. States that initially demurred in the face of public pressure to cooperate in the regulation of forestry practices are now adopting these "private" standards. This complicates the relationships between states, corporations, and NGOs as the latter two combine to negotiate legal-type structures which are then adopted by states as the result of political and economic pressures.
Does the new "transnational regulatory and governance regime" represent a challenge to democratic legitimacy? Comments from the audience suggested that these non-state standards (mostly developed by interest groups in the West) might be oppressive of states that are subsequently forced to adopt the standards in order to preserve access to profitable markets.
There are two factors that suggest another interpretation of the new regime -- and perhaps different questions. First, the appearance of the administrative state in the last century means that many more areas of human endeavour in developed nations are subject to government regulation. But, in the developing world, the power of states to control the actions of their industries and citizens is not so comprehensive. Second, the rapid growth of transnational corporations means that Western-based industries are able to outsource many of their factors of production to administratively weak regions.
Administratively strong states cannot (and perhaps should not) impose standards on these weaker regions through traditional international law-making institutions. The failure of "Westphalian" bodies to achieve consensus on environmental, labour, and other standards has left a regulatory vacuum that leaves transnational corporations room to set up shop far from the reach of extensive regulations in their home countries and allows them to operate freely within countries that, dependent on the economic benefits of foreign investment, are either unwilling or simply unable to implement strict regulations of their own.
Enter the transnational regulatory system that is able to 1) network with stakeholders around the world to develop best practices, 2) cut through political borders to monitor TNCs, and 3) enforce standards through the threat of decertification and consumer activism. In short, these non-state standards skirt global disparities in governmental power in order to make TNCs accountable to -- yes, stakeholders but, ultimately, publicly-minded consumers. As a result, the real strength of a TNC -- its brand -- is also its biggest vulnerability. The corporate brand is the bull's nose where the developing transnational regulatory system has inserted its ring.
Is democratic legitimacy still the right question? The above thoughts don't suggest that the question is not important -- only that it may be premature and perhaps irrelevant.