Sunday, July 08, 2007

Positive Freedom and Public Values

Francis Fukuyama has given an impressively self-contradictory interview to New Perspectives Quarterly on "The Challenge of Positive Freedom." Positive freedom is understood by the interviewer Nathan Gardels as "freedom to" or the freedom of self-realization, as opposed to negative freedom, which is understood as freedom from tyranny and interference. Defined this way, of course, the two freedoms are mirror images of each other: a person will have positive freedom to the extent they are free from negative interference. In a modern, complex, and multicultural society, it is inconceivable that you can have one without the other.

For example, it is hard to argue that a Sikh has freedom from government interference with his religion if he does not have freedom to wear his turban when he joins the police force. It is also hard to argue that a gay or lesbian person has positive sexual freedom if his or her relationship cannot be registered in the protected institution of marriage. The latter freedom, among others, is seen as abhorrent by more monolithic (and generally more traditional) cultures that have a thick sense of shared values. This is true for the formerly politically passive evangelical right, the Catholic church, the majority of Muslims, and other traditional communities.

The problem is how a society can contain and provide positive freedoms to all groups, regardless of how widely their values diverge. One may argue for a live and let live philosophy, but this neat solution quickly breaks down within participatory democracies where citizens of deep conviction are encouraged to take public office and pass laws promoting their elected vision of the public interest.

Broad notions of positive freedom within liberal societies are challenged by nonliberal constituents, and these challenges have two possible destabilizing effects. One effect, resulting at least in part from the political mobilization of nonliberals, is a "culture war" like that taking place in the United States. Divergent notions of shared values produce deep fissures within the public sphere, and the "polarization" of political debate. A second effect, resulting from the political (and often economic and cultural) disenfranchisement of nonliberals, is that nonliberals end up being marginalized as in Europe, and display all the symptoms of rage and frustration that both undermine the social order and accelerate cycles of blame, repression, rebellion and -- ultimately -- violence.

Fukuyama thinks the American Creed of "belief in individualism, belief in work as a value, belief in the freedom of mobility and popular sovereignty" is a practical solution to the problem of generating sufficient shared values for a stable society. But, earlier in the interview, he says the "valuelessness projected by American mass culture is a problem" and also that "what we see today on the global stage is in some sense an extension of America's own culture wars." One might say that European relativism is manifesting itself as internal dysfunction and that American relativism is manifesting itself as global dysfunction. So how is the American Creed a "practical solution" that evades the necessity of a more fundamental solution to Leo Strauss's question of "whether there is a way of establishing values through reason and philosophical discourse without reverting to religion"?

Perhaps Fukuyama has an answer to this dilemma. At the beginning of the interview, he states that,
Hegel had a more positive sense of what freedom is in terms of the recognition of basic human dignity, of the capacity to make moral choices. So, in a sense the "end of history" means the beginning of the reconstruction of a more positive, substantive, idea of what it means to live in a liberal democracy.
Can the recognition of human dignity form the foundation for a society's internal integrity and external relations? And what does human dignity mean? The Supreme Court of Canada opined on the meaning of human dignity in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) as follows:
Human dignity means that an individual or group feels self-respect and self-worth. It is concerned with physical and psychological integrity and empowerment. Human dignity is harmed by unfair treatment premised upon personal traits or circumstances which do not relate to individual needs, capacities, or merits. It is enhanced by laws which are sensitive to the needs, capacities, and merits of different individuals, taking into account the context underlying their differences. Human dignity is harmed when individuals and groups are marginalized, ignored, or devalued, and is enhanced when laws recognize the full place of all individuals and groups within Canadian society.
Yet this definition may only be convincing to Canadians because of the relatively equitable distribution of wealth (as compared to that of certain other countries), our ignorance of the plight of First Nations, our blindness to the growing segregation of minorities in major Canadian cities, or even because the climate precludes protests for six months of the year. In other words, does the relative stability of Canadian society and politics mean that Canadians have more extensively shared values and, by extension, a more integrated liberal society than either the United States or Europe?

Sunday, March 04, 2007

Access to Justice

Is access to justice the same thing as access to courts? Ontario Chief Justice McMurtry thinks so. In yesterday's online edition of the Toronto Star, he noted that "it's only the relatively affluent, for the most part, who can afford to go through to a trial." The Star then attributed him with saying that "access to justice...is the most important issue facing the legal system." Access to justice initiatives are focused on simplifying procedures, removing "bottlenecks" (some of which were put in place to ensure a fair result), and creating more funding for the legal aid system. These initiatives assume that courts are the centres for justice in our society.

But what if courts only play a supporting role in the performance of justice? Robert Wolfe, a law professor at Queen's University, writes:
a court is not necessarily a central institution for law -- [Fuller] argued that adjudication as 'a social process of decision' depends on decision by a third party after the presentation of proofs and reasoned arguments, a form of participation that serves some ends but not others. Courts have high thresholds for bringing issues before them, Komesar shows, and their formality raises the costs of participation, especially information costs. The nature of the stakes affects what sorts of issues are likely to be adjudicated, and why... Courts can only resolve matters that are brought to them... Courts are one of many social institutions for making collective decisions, not a uniquely authoritative site for determining what is 'legal'... When the only institution that we can imagine is formal adjudication, we limit the way in which we can understand the problem, the scope of participation, and the types of possible outcome.
A better picture of the notion of access to justice would acknowledge that justice is a diffuse process that takes place on various levels. The legislature has as much a duty to provide justice as the courts. So do the various service providers, ombudsmen, tribunals, and boards. Nor is the furtherance of justice restricted to public authorities. Various civil society organizations also play a role in access to justice. Think, for example, of the way in which the Better Business Bureau holds companies to account for the way they treat their customers. In a society where the administrative state is extensive, the economy and social relations are complex, and extra funds are scarce, we need to start thinking outside the four walls of the courtroom if we are going to solve the problem of access to justice.

Thursday, March 01, 2007

Judicial Advisory Committees: Independence at Risk

A letter I sent to a Conservative MP today:

I appreciate hearing your take on changes to the judicial advisory committees. While in general I don't oppose the idea of changes to the system (judges often downplay their political commitments), I wanted to clarify, in writing, my concerns about the recent changes.

The Judicial Advisory Committees were created in 1988 in response to concerns about large numbers of Liberal party loyalists being appointed to the judiciary in the wake of Trudeau's loss. The committees were meant to place judicial appointments at one remove from government, and ensure that candidates were selected on their merits. Therefore, the federal government was given a minority voice on the committee, with the balance selected and held by the legal community.

The recent changes appear to upset that balance: the federal government now has a majority voice on the committee. I agree that the law enforcement community should have a voice, but I don't think its voice should have come at the expense of the judiciary's vote. The former Minister of Justice stated that the goal of the changes was to "expand the pool of consultation." However, it seems more likely that the changes were meant to, as Prime Minister Stephen Harper suggested, "make sure that we crack down on crime." Will it only be judges who are publicly motivated to "crack down on crime" who are appointed? And, under a different government, will it only be judges who are known to be "progressive" who are appointed?

It does seem to me that the changes, as implemented, will tend to signal to prospective and current judges that their discretion should be exercised in line with current government policy. It certainly does not amount to telling judges what to decide in particular cases, but the changes do appear to undermine the principle of judicial independence.

I remember asking an older judge, who was also a long-time member of the Salvation Army church, what he thought of mandatory minimum sentences or the "one strike, you're out" approach. He said, "I don't think much of them," and explained that judges have to consider the wide variety of circumstances in which accused persons find themselves. The hardened criminal is one situation but, he asked me, what do you do with the 18-year-old kid who's made a mistake, or fallen in with a bad crowd? Is a mandatory prison term the best solution for them?

People run afoul of the law for all kinds of reasons, and the uniqueness of these situations is the reason for giving judges discretion. I just can't see how implementing a general government policy of being "tough on crime" through the back door of appointments will lead to greater justice for Canadians.

Tuesday, February 20, 2007

The Drama of Comparative Law

Has comparative law come of age? Peer Zumbansen's recent retrospective on Gunter Frankenberg's 20-year-old "Critical Comparisons" article suggests that comparative law is still struggling with the same conflict that inspired Frankenberg's critique of facile juxtapositions and problem-solving. The former attempts to derive common precepts; the latter, to display different solutions to common problems. Both privilege law and both depend on familiar conceptual paradigms.

One pitfall, or opportunity, that Zumbansen hints at in his article is that the idea of comparative law is itself artificial, as it relies on an intersection between legal systems that may, in reality, meet only between the pages of a comparative journal. In this case, comparative law appears to be a (purely) theoretical dialogue in which the comparative scholar takes both sides. In a way, therefore, the comparative legal enterprise is a dramatic production, with all its artifices and assumed roles that, ideally, creates meaning while not necessarily mimicking reality.

Sunday, January 28, 2007

Corporate rights

The directors have a duty to the corporation (Peoples v. Wise) but to whom does the corporation owe its duty? What are the interests, rights, and obligations of the the corporation? Some argue for the existence of "corporate rights;" this would imply that corporations, like other legal persons, operate within a standing relationship with those other persons, and within a standing relationship between persons and the government. Does this rights-oriented point of view even make sense for "fictional" legal persons? In what way are corporate rights and duties different from individual rights and duties? Would the answers to these questions clarify the corporate governance debate?
As constructions and emanations of the state, modern corporations have a distinctly public origin and a decidedly public purpose.

Allan Hutchinson, "Public Policy and Private Cupidity"

Wednesday, January 17, 2007

Thesis proposal - first draft

I've started thinking more about the possibility of doing a master's degree, my speculation perhaps arising out of the apparent impossibility of a generalist like me finding a job. My main difficulty with the prospect of further education is the lack of a clear topic of study. However, this morning, I had an idea:

I would like to look at the relational character of fiduciary obligation, and its implications for the roles of directors and shareholders, whose duties and expectations coalesce in the institution of the corporation. This study would be explicated in the context of recent calls for increased accountability (mainly expressed in the demand for more regulation), better leaders, consideration of "stakeholders" when making management decisions, etc. While the general sense that corporate leaders should be, in some way, "responsible" has deepened, the law still says that directors are responsible to "the corporation" - not to stakeholders, or even shareholders & creditors. For that reason, the connections between directors and stakeholders, as well as the broader public, remain obscure.

The idea of corporate responsibility as relational does not come from my intuition that some relationship must exist. Rather, it arises by analogy from my reading of Martin Loughlin's recent book on the idea of public law, and how the character of sovereignty is often misunderstood or insufficiently described as the power of command, the responsibility to act in the "public interest" (whatever that means), or (more democratically) the duty to follow the wishes of one's constituency. Loughlin says that these conceptions of sovereignty fail to acknowledge that sovereignty is representational and relational. I would like to analogize these characteristics of the public body corporate to the economic body corporate, and unwrap the implications of this analogy under the theme of corporate fiduciary obligation.

Saturday, December 23, 2006

Shifting fault lines

A hypothesis worth pursuing...is that the new liberal regime is expanding its remit at the same time as—and perhaps because of—its decreasing capacity to deliver the wide-ranging social services it used to think of as essential to its mandate. If there is truth is this, the irony is rich: as liberal states, under pressures from increasingly globalized economic exchanges, are less and less able or willing to resist the progressive marketization of civil society, and the consequent dismantling of their welfare systems, they simultaneously pursue the progressive politicization of civil society. As the power to restrain business corporations slips through their fingers—indeed, as they all too willingly cede it—they grab hold ever more jealously of the reins of voluntary associations, which are easier targets. A diagnosis of this new apparent twist in the pathology of late modern liberal states awaits.
Jonathan Chaplin, "Living with liberalism: understanding regimes of tolerance," (2006) 34 Comment (no page #) online: Comment [http://www.wrf.ca/comment/article.cfm?ID=222].

I really don't have time to "comment" right now, but my first thought is that this idea could be related to Teubner's constitutionalization of private associations, which may not be the quite the same thing or have the same effects as Chaplin's preliminary diagnosis above. Other thoughts?