Sunday, July 08, 2007

Positive Freedom and Public Values

Francis Fukuyama has given an impressively self-contradictory interview to New Perspectives Quarterly on "The Challenge of Positive Freedom." Positive freedom is understood by the interviewer Nathan Gardels as "freedom to" or the freedom of self-realization, as opposed to negative freedom, which is understood as freedom from tyranny and interference. Defined this way, of course, the two freedoms are mirror images of each other: a person will have positive freedom to the extent they are free from negative interference. In a modern, complex, and multicultural society, it is inconceivable that you can have one without the other.

For example, it is hard to argue that a Sikh has freedom from government interference with his religion if he does not have freedom to wear his turban when he joins the police force. It is also hard to argue that a gay or lesbian person has positive sexual freedom if his or her relationship cannot be registered in the protected institution of marriage. The latter freedom, among others, is seen as abhorrent by more monolithic (and generally more traditional) cultures that have a thick sense of shared values. This is true for the formerly politically passive evangelical right, the Catholic church, the majority of Muslims, and other traditional communities.

The problem is how a society can contain and provide positive freedoms to all groups, regardless of how widely their values diverge. One may argue for a live and let live philosophy, but this neat solution quickly breaks down within participatory democracies where citizens of deep conviction are encouraged to take public office and pass laws promoting their elected vision of the public interest.

Broad notions of positive freedom within liberal societies are challenged by nonliberal constituents, and these challenges have two possible destabilizing effects. One effect, resulting at least in part from the political mobilization of nonliberals, is a "culture war" like that taking place in the United States. Divergent notions of shared values produce deep fissures within the public sphere, and the "polarization" of political debate. A second effect, resulting from the political (and often economic and cultural) disenfranchisement of nonliberals, is that nonliberals end up being marginalized as in Europe, and display all the symptoms of rage and frustration that both undermine the social order and accelerate cycles of blame, repression, rebellion and -- ultimately -- violence.

Fukuyama thinks the American Creed of "belief in individualism, belief in work as a value, belief in the freedom of mobility and popular sovereignty" is a practical solution to the problem of generating sufficient shared values for a stable society. But, earlier in the interview, he says the "valuelessness projected by American mass culture is a problem" and also that "what we see today on the global stage is in some sense an extension of America's own culture wars." One might say that European relativism is manifesting itself as internal dysfunction and that American relativism is manifesting itself as global dysfunction. So how is the American Creed a "practical solution" that evades the necessity of a more fundamental solution to Leo Strauss's question of "whether there is a way of establishing values through reason and philosophical discourse without reverting to religion"?

Perhaps Fukuyama has an answer to this dilemma. At the beginning of the interview, he states that,
Hegel had a more positive sense of what freedom is in terms of the recognition of basic human dignity, of the capacity to make moral choices. So, in a sense the "end of history" means the beginning of the reconstruction of a more positive, substantive, idea of what it means to live in a liberal democracy.
Can the recognition of human dignity form the foundation for a society's internal integrity and external relations? And what does human dignity mean? The Supreme Court of Canada opined on the meaning of human dignity in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) as follows:
Human dignity means that an individual or group feels self-respect and self-worth. It is concerned with physical and psychological integrity and empowerment. Human dignity is harmed by unfair treatment premised upon personal traits or circumstances which do not relate to individual needs, capacities, or merits. It is enhanced by laws which are sensitive to the needs, capacities, and merits of different individuals, taking into account the context underlying their differences. Human dignity is harmed when individuals and groups are marginalized, ignored, or devalued, and is enhanced when laws recognize the full place of all individuals and groups within Canadian society.
Yet this definition may only be convincing to Canadians because of the relatively equitable distribution of wealth (as compared to that of certain other countries), our ignorance of the plight of First Nations, our blindness to the growing segregation of minorities in major Canadian cities, or even because the climate precludes protests for six months of the year. In other words, does the relative stability of Canadian society and politics mean that Canadians have more extensively shared values and, by extension, a more integrated liberal society than either the United States or Europe?

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