But what if courts only play a supporting role in the performance of justice? Robert Wolfe, a law professor at Queen's University, writes:
a court is not necessarily a central institution for law -- [Fuller] argued that adjudication as 'a social process of decision' depends on decision by a third party after the presentation of proofs and reasoned arguments, a form of participation that serves some ends but not others. Courts have high thresholds for bringing issues before them, Komesar shows, and their formality raises the costs of participation, especially information costs. The nature of the stakes affects what sorts of issues are likely to be adjudicated, and why... Courts can only resolve matters that are brought to them... Courts are one of many social institutions for making collective decisions, not a uniquely authoritative site for determining what is 'legal'... When the only institution that we can imagine is formal adjudication, we limit the way in which we can understand the problem, the scope of participation, and the types of possible outcome.A better picture of the notion of access to justice would acknowledge that justice is a diffuse process that takes place on various levels. The legislature has as much a duty to provide justice as the courts. So do the various service providers, ombudsmen, tribunals, and boards. Nor is the furtherance of justice restricted to public authorities. Various civil society organizations also play a role in access to justice. Think, for example, of the way in which the Better Business Bureau holds companies to account for the way they treat their customers. In a society where the administrative state is extensive, the economy and social relations are complex, and extra funds are scarce, we need to start thinking outside the four walls of the courtroom if we are going to solve the problem of access to justice.