Sunday, November 19, 2006

Corruption: Defined

The next series of entries will consist of excerpts and commentary related to my Chinese Law paper on corruption.

Corruption can be broadly defined as the "inappropriate use of political power" (Jain, 2001). Under this general definition, corruption can include both economic and non-economic abuses of power. Bribery is an example of the former; nepotism is an example of the latter. However, to say that corruption is the "inappropriate" use of power is almost to beg the question. In what instances can we say that political power has been used inappropriately? Is pork barrel politics, for example, an instance of corruption or is it just good representation? What about corporate financing for political parties? This line of questioning suggests that the definition of corruption is contextual and has a lot to do with the political norms of a given society.

The link between politics and corruption is noted by Jain when he says that "although corruption makes itself visible as an economic transaction [note this is not quite consistent with his broad definition above - JB], it would not exist if the political institutions were able to exert the necessary influences and controls." He then states explicitly that corruption reflects a failure of economic and political "markets" and that a "successful fight against corruption, which is really one part of the challenge for effective governance of societies, would seem to require a thorough understanding of the link between political institutions and corruption."

My sense is that, even if we were to confine ourselves to political corruption manifesting itself as an economic transaction, the fact we need to subject it to "influences" and "controls" suggests that such corruption consists of illicit transactions. That is to say, corruption violates a norm of some kind. But what kind of norm do we mean when we are discussing corruption? Legal? Cultural? Moral? It does seem apparent that corruption involves the violation of a social norm - the corrupt person rejects a broader interest (e.g. the public interest) to feed a narrower interest (e.g. him or herself, or his or her group). The corrupt person is under our opprobrium because he or she has somehow not performed the duties of the "office" he or she has been entrusted with and has used the prerogatives of that office for his or her own ends.

The duties of a given office depend on the social context of that office; when we are talking about public office, the appropriate use of an office will depend on its political context. Therefore, what counts as "corruption" will depend on the political shape of a society. Of course, it is possible that a society's stated understanding of corruption (as seen in its policies and laws) is inconsistent with its political shape as determined by its history, culture, and institutions. In that case, we can expect that corruption will be widespread unless and until the society's policies and laws also succeed in changing its political shape.

The questions for this paper will be:
  1. How is corruption legally defined in China?
  2. What "political shape" does China's legal definition presume?
  3. Is that political shape reflected in China's "public" sphere?
  4. What is the incidence of public corruption in China?
  5. What strategies is China using to reduce the incidence of corruption and are these strategies likely to be successful?
  6. If not, what should China be doing to attain a low incidence of corruption?

Friday, November 10, 2006

Public and Private International Law: Finding Common Ground

Though slightly off topic, this is an interesting entry by Kenneth Anderson, who thinks
...there should be room for scholars who consciously seek to bridge the academic divide between international public law and international private, economic, business, and finance law. In my own mind and work they are both seamless parts of the study of globalization, and in that sense can benefit from being pursued together. As aspects of the study of globalization, this seems like a very contemporary way of viewing private and public international law on a single continuum.
He would like also like to see more concepts from international economic development brought into the mix, and adds that the law of economic development is not simply about rights:
development work is equally well-considered as a matter of business, finance, rational choice theory, a peculiar species of foreign direct investment, and law and economics in the matter of how aid is provided, used, and its outcomes. It can be approached as business law, with huge benefits.

Wednesday, November 01, 2006

Filling the Regulatory Vacuum: Part 2

I may have shortchanged the last paragraph of the previous post to avoid getting into a (much longer) discussion of the preconditions for the question of democratic legitimacy. I would not want to leave politics or law out of the discussion; of course the standards-making process must be legitimate. But, in response to some grief over my setting aside of the question of democratic legitimacy, my points could be revised as follows:
  1. Western states have strong and thick administrative structures that are "legitimate" and often, in practice, unassailable; however, it is not usually the presence of these structures that lead to criticisms of the "democratic deficit". Rather, transparency and accountability are key factors in judging whether or not an administration (as opposed to a government) is legitimate.
  2. Developing states (often) have weak or thin administrative structures, and those structures that do exist are quite often highly contested (i.e. "the emperor is far away").
  3. All states are sovereign, which means, first, they are stuck with their administrative strengths and/or weaknesses and, second, they cannot fix the weaknesses of other states without "intruding."
  4. TNCs operate across states; therefore, they can take advantage of both the limited jurisdiction of the strong states and the limited laws or powers of enforcement within the weak state.
  5. Transnational regulatory systems also operate across states to address the regulatory vacuum of point #4 -- while both political (maybe even a type of colonization) and legal (they are comprised of rules and enforcement), they bypass but do not replace that particular political-legal container known as the state. If there are questions regarding their democratic legitimacy, they only mirror the questions of democratic legitimacy within the strong administrative state.
  6. The questions are complicated by the fact that transnational regulatory systems cross sovereign boundaries precisely for the purpose of making TNCs or even states accountable to strong, though sector-based, administrative regimes that are influenced neither by government agendas nor by market forces. The driving force behind these regulatory systems lies within that elusive domain of civil society, with its admixture of politics, morality, economics, etc.
I think these six elements lead to the conclusion that, while the question of democratic legitimacy may be relevant, it can only come after the questions regarding the nature of sovereignty, the modes of politics, and transparency and participation within non-state rule-making processes. These questions have the advantage that they can be addressed independent of whether or not a given state is democratic (a condition that would undermine any discussion of democratic legitimacy).