As constructions and emanations of the state, modern corporations have a distinctly public origin and a decidedly public purpose.Allan Hutchinson, "Public Policy and Private Cupidity"
Sunday, January 28, 2007
Corporate rights
The directors have a duty to the corporation (Peoples v. Wise) but to whom does the corporation owe its duty? What are the interests, rights, and obligations of the the corporation? Some argue for the existence of "corporate rights;" this would imply that corporations, like other legal persons, operate within a standing relationship with those other persons, and within a standing relationship between persons and the government. Does this rights-oriented point of view even make sense for "fictional" legal persons? In what way are corporate rights and duties different from individual rights and duties? Would the answers to these questions clarify the corporate governance debate?
Wednesday, January 17, 2007
Thesis proposal - first draft
I've started thinking more about the possibility of doing a master's degree, my speculation perhaps arising out of the apparent impossibility of a generalist like me finding a job. My main difficulty with the prospect of further education is the lack of a clear topic of study. However, this morning, I had an idea:
I would like to look at the relational character of fiduciary obligation, and its implications for the roles of directors and shareholders, whose duties and expectations coalesce in the institution of the corporation. This study would be explicated in the context of recent calls for increased accountability (mainly expressed in the demand for more regulation), better leaders, consideration of "stakeholders" when making management decisions, etc. While the general sense that corporate leaders should be, in some way, "responsible" has deepened, the law still says that directors are responsible to "the corporation" - not to stakeholders, or even shareholders & creditors. For that reason, the connections between directors and stakeholders, as well as the broader public, remain obscure.
The idea of corporate responsibility as relational does not come from my intuition that some relationship must exist. Rather, it arises by analogy from my reading of Martin Loughlin's recent book on the idea of public law, and how the character of sovereignty is often misunderstood or insufficiently described as the power of command, the responsibility to act in the "public interest" (whatever that means), or (more democratically) the duty to follow the wishes of one's constituency. Loughlin says that these conceptions of sovereignty fail to acknowledge that sovereignty is representational and relational. I would like to analogize these characteristics of the public body corporate to the economic body corporate, and unwrap the implications of this analogy under the theme of corporate fiduciary obligation.
I would like to look at the relational character of fiduciary obligation, and its implications for the roles of directors and shareholders, whose duties and expectations coalesce in the institution of the corporation. This study would be explicated in the context of recent calls for increased accountability (mainly expressed in the demand for more regulation), better leaders, consideration of "stakeholders" when making management decisions, etc. While the general sense that corporate leaders should be, in some way, "responsible" has deepened, the law still says that directors are responsible to "the corporation" - not to stakeholders, or even shareholders & creditors. For that reason, the connections between directors and stakeholders, as well as the broader public, remain obscure.
The idea of corporate responsibility as relational does not come from my intuition that some relationship must exist. Rather, it arises by analogy from my reading of Martin Loughlin's recent book on the idea of public law, and how the character of sovereignty is often misunderstood or insufficiently described as the power of command, the responsibility to act in the "public interest" (whatever that means), or (more democratically) the duty to follow the wishes of one's constituency. Loughlin says that these conceptions of sovereignty fail to acknowledge that sovereignty is representational and relational. I would like to analogize these characteristics of the public body corporate to the economic body corporate, and unwrap the implications of this analogy under the theme of corporate fiduciary obligation.
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